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OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
A copy of the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals is attached to the
Addendum at Tab 1.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter under the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its construction and application of

relevant precedent to Petitioner's claim for severance damages for loss of view.
Standard of Review: The interpretation and construction of relevant precedent is
reviewed on appeal for correctness. See Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon,
2002 UT 99, t 12, 61 P.3d 1009 ("We review the court of appeals' decision for
correctness, and give its conclusions of law no deference."); Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT
76, Tf 5, 31 P.3d 537 ("Correctness is also the standard for review of questions of statutory
interpretation."); State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857 (Utah 1994) ("A court of appeals'
interpretation of the effect of a prior judicial decision, whether one of its own or one of
another court, constitutes a conclusion of law to which we accord no particular deference.
Review is for correctness.").
2.

Whether damages for loss of view may be segregated from overall

severance damages.
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Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court
of Appeals for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. See Bear River
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, 1 5, 978 P.2d 460 ("On certiorari, we review the
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court. We review the court
of appeals' decision for correctness and give its conclusions of law no deference.")
(internal citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 22.
§ 78B-6-511(2), Utah Code Annotated.
Rule 45, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed its Complaint in this
case (Case No. 970905361) on July 31, 1997, seeking to condemn a portion of property
(the "Mark Property") then owned by Mark Investment Company for purposes of the 1-15
reconstruction project. (R. 11-20.)
Prior to the reconstruction of 1-15, both the north and south bound travel lanes
were at about the same elevation as the Admiral and Mark Properties. This afforded
Admiral an open view to the east from Ensign Peak on the north to Mount Timpanogos
on the south. As a part of the 1-15 reconstruction, the travel lanes were elevated to a
height of some 27 feet thereby obstructing any view to the east from the remainder and
leaving the remainder property in a virtual hole. (R. 181, 494-95.)
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The Mark Property was purchased by Admiral on July 22, 1998 (R. 172), based
upon fair market value appraisal of both the Mark Property and the adjoining Admiral
Property, dated November 25, 1994, prepared by Jerry R. Webber, MAI. (R. 773-74.)
On August 1, 1997, UDOT filed its Complaint in Case No. 970905368 seeking to
condemn a portion of the neighboring piece of property (the "Admiral Property"), which
was owned by Admiral, also for purposes of the 1-15 reconstruction project. (R. 1-10.)
The Admiral Property was purchased by Admiral on April 20, 2001 (R. 172-73),
based upon a second fair market value appraisal prepared by Jerry R. Webber, dated
October 17, 1996. (R. 773-74.) Jerry Webber also prepared a third fair market value
appraisal of both the Mark Property and the Admiral Property dated September 7, 2007,
as Admiral's expert witness in this case. Id. Admiral subsequently purchased the Mark
property from Mark Investment Company. As a result, on July 14, 1999, the trial court
entered an order consolidating Case No. 970905368 into this case, Case No. 970905361.
(R. 63-64.)
In early 2005, the parties filed cross motions in limine regarding the type of
evidence that would be admissible to prove Admiral's severance damages. (R. 151-163,
168-189.) Following oral argument, on October 31, 2005, Judge Stephen L. Roth entered
a Memorandum Decision and Order, wherein he granted UDOT's motion in limine and
denied Admiral's cross motion in limine ("Judge Roth's Order"). (Addendum Tab 2) (R.
492-502.) The effect to Judge Roth's Order, dated October 31, 2005, was to eliminate all
of Admiral's claims for severance damages. (R. 500-501.)
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However, Judge Roth noted the patent unfairness to Admiral of his ruling in a
footnote at page 10 of his decision:
The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule
that the court has relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding,
it is certainly possible that the court's decision would have been
significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been built
six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109.
In this regard Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal
given the harsh result the difference of a matter of inches may produce.
That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated project
(which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled
to compensation for damages resulting from specific improvements related
to the purpose of the taking and causing specific injury to the remainder,
even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries of the
take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support
of Its Motion in Limine . . ., at 6-10. This approach recognizes that the
actual reduction in value of the remainder from the improvement, as a
practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just
outside of the taken parcel.
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal)
holdings of the Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from
seriously considering such an approach at this level, because it would
involve a departure from current law. In this regard, the appellate courts
are better equipped to identify, analyze and resolve the competing public
and private interests, as well as the legal complications, that would be
implicated in such a change in approach to severance damages. The
resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal.
(Addendum Tab 2) (R. at 501.)
Because Judge Roth's Order involved unique legal issues of first impression in
Utah, as noted above, he subsequently certified his ruling for appeal under Rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 522-23.) However, on August 10, 2006, the Utah
Court of Appeals dismissed Admiral's appeal without prejudice stating that Judge Roth's
Order was "not an order eligible for certification under Rule 54(b)." (R. 556-59.)
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Following the dismissal of Admiral's appeal, the case was assigned to the Honorable
Robert P. Faust.
In February 2007, the Utah Supreme Court handed down its decision in Ivers v.
Utah Dept. of Tramp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, which dealt with a factual setting
virtually identical to the facts of the present case, as is explained infra.
In mid to late 2007, UDOT filed a series of additional motions in limine seeking to
exclude evidence at trial relating to, among other things, Admiral's severance damages
caused by the loss of view and visibility. (R. 656-64, 733-35, 780-82.) On December 27,
2007, the trial court entered a Minute Entry, wherein it granted UDOT's motions in
limine (the "Minute Entry"). (Addendum Tab 3) (R. 862-64.) The practical effect of the
trial court's Minute Entry was that it again disposed of Admiral's claims for severance
damages. See id.
Although the Ivers case was referred to and quoted in Admiral's brief in the trial
court, Judge Faust's Minute Entry dated December 27, 2007, does not even refer to the
Ivers decision, which was handed down ten months earlier. Rather, Judge Faust's Minute
Entry simply "refers the parties to Judge Roth's earlier decision and adopts the same
here." (R. 866.)
On January 10, 2008, Admiral petitioned for permission to pursue an interlocutory
appeal from Judge Faust's Minute Entry. (R. 872-74.) On January 30, 2008, the Utah
Court of Appeals issued its order granting Admiral permission to pursue an interlocutory
appeal on the following issue: "Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
severance damages based on loss of view from the remaining property." (R. 895.)
5
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On November 28, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the District
Court. (Addendum Tab 1.)
In its Memorandum Decision, the Utah Court of Appeals noted, as Judge Roth
had, the harshness as to Admiral of its ruling:
We acknowledge that application of the abutment rule in this case may
seem harsh, given that Admiral's proximity to the now-elevated 1-15 is very
close and that its property abuts land taken for the overall project. Still, the
ease of application and the predictability engendered by a bright-line rule
are of such obvious benefit in this area of the law that if the abutment rule
is to be moderated, it must come at the direction of our Supreme Court
rather than of this court.
(Addendum Tab 1.)
On January 8, 2009, Admiral filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. That Petition
was granted by the Utah Supreme Court on April 17, 2009.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision of the Court of Appeals, which excludes evidence of severance
damages based upon loss of view from Admiral's remaining property, is flawed for
multiple reasons. First, the ruling conflicts with Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution. Second, the ruling conflicts with this Court's decision in Ivers v. Utah
Dept ofTransp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802. Third, the Court of Appeals' decision to
exclude evidence of severance damages based on loss of view will allow UDOT to reap a
windfall at Admiral's expense. Finally, it is impossible for Admiral to segregate its loss
of view damages from its overall severance damage amount. Accordingly, the Court
should reverse the Court of Appeals' November 28, 2008 Memorandum Decision and
remand this matter for further proceedings.
6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court's decision, affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals, to
exclude evidence of severance damage from loss of view, conflicts with
Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
Both Amendment V of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of
the Utah Constitution prohibit the taking of private property without just compensation.
In carrying out these constitutional mandates, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511
provides that in a condemnation action the court, jury or referee must ascertain and
assess:
(l)(a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all
improvements pertaining to the realty;
* * *

(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of
each estate or interest in each shall be separately assessed;
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of
a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to
be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff;
The compensation to which an owner is entitled for "severance damage" to the remainder
under subsection (2) is the difference in the fair market value of the owner's remaining
property before and after the taking. See, e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 247 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952); Carpet Barn v.
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State, 786 P.2d 770, 772-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).1 Such a determination can only be
made by considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value:
In making the [severance damage] appraisal, it is not only permissible, but
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a prudent and
willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into
account in arriving at market value.
J.D. Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, 316 (1995) (quoting State Road Com fn v.
Rohan, 487 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1971)). The effect of the taking on fair market value,
therefore, should be the focal point of the assessment of severance damages to the
remainder in the present case.
As stated in Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Utah 1995):
[u]nder general principles of eminent domain, property is not limited to
land or improvements thereon, id., but "[e]very species of property which
the public needs may require . . . (including) legal and equitable rights of
every description . . . liable to be appropriated."
Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, this Court has clearly set the rules by which just
compensation for such a taking should be determined:
For compensation to be fair and just it must reflect fair value of the land to
the landowner. Just compensation means the owners must be put in as
good a position money wise as they would have occupied had their property
not been taken.
Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984).

Just

compensation is the difference in fair market value of the owner's property before and
after the taking. See Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. Ray Co. Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979).

Utah courts have long utilized the market value of property as the yardstick for
determining recovery in eminent domain cases. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur,
352 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1960).
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Despite the fact that no exception is made in these constitutional mandates or in
Utah law for special treatment of UDOT in condemnation cases, UDOT has repeatedly
asked Utah courts to sanction violations by it of the "just compensation" requirement and
permit it to take valuable property rights without payment of compensation. This is so
despite the fact that no other condemning authority, including the United States, is given
that right.
Utah cases which have permitted the taking of privately held rights without
payment of compensation make no effort to reconcile the undeniable inconsistency and
conflict of such takings with the above quoted constitutional, statutory or case law. No
justification is given for the unfair and forced transfer to UDOT of substantial property
rights without payment of any compensation, let alone just compensation.
This case presents a stark example of the inconsistency and unfairness of the
UDOT's position. Each of the parcels taken had been purchased by Admiral based upon
appraised fair market value. It is undisputed that substantial severance damages resulted
from the taking. However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals approved, with some
reluctance, UDOT's request that it be exempt from the obligation all other condemning
authorities have to meet, and provide just compensation for the property rights taken from
Admiral. At the time Admiral purchased each of the two parcels, it could not have
known or expected that UDOT would take a significant portion of the value Admiral
purchased without having to pay anything for that value.

9
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POINT II
The trial court's decision, affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals, to
exclude evidence of severance damages based on loss of view conflicts
with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Ivers v. Utah Dept of
Tramp., 2007 UT 19,154 P.3d 802 .
In February of 2007, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in Ivers v. Utah
Dept. of Transp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, essentially rewriting important rules
regarding severance damages relating to loss of view and visibility. The Utah Supreme
Court declared that "existing Utah law does recognize an easement of view from one's
property as a protectable property right." Id. at Tf 16. The trial court's Minute Entry in
this case, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, fails to address, and in important respects is
directly contrary to, the Ivers decision.
In Ivers, just like the present case, UDOT argued that the landowner was not
entitled to any damages for loss of view because "[n]o portion of the raised highway, its
footings, or its foundation was constructed on the condemned land; rather, the
condemned land was used for the creation of the frontage road and for improvements to
Shephard Lane." Id. at ]f 3. Despite this fact, the court in Ivers ruled that loss of view
severance damages are appropriate "when the view-impairing structure is built on land
other than the condemned land, but the condemned land is used as part of a single project
and that use is essential to completion of the project." Id. at ^f 26.
It would be difficult to find a case more on point with the present case than Ivers.
In that case:

10
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[T]he State condemned a 0.048-acre portion of Arby's 0.416-acre lot in
order to build a one-way frontage road parallel to, and connecting with, the
newly widened and elevated highway.
* * *

No portion of the raised highway, its footings, or its foundation was
constructed on the condemned land; rather, the condemned land was used
for the creation of the frontage road and for improvements to Shephard
Lane.
* * *

The elevation of the highway has obstructed both the view to the east from
Arby's land and the visibility of Arby's property from the highway.
* * *

[T]he pursuant loss of view and visibility, diminished the market value of
the remaining land.
Id. at TJTf 2-5. After reviewing the facts, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
ITIhe raised highway . . . was not built in any part on the condemned
portion of Arby's land. Rather, the condemned land was used for the
construction of a small portion of the frontage road. The frontage road
itself causes no damage to the view from Arby's remaining land. However,
. . . the land was condemned as part of UDOT's plan to raise the highway
and was therefore condemned as part of a single project.
Whether severance damages are awardable hinges on whether the severance
of the condemned property, and the use of that property, caused damage to
the remaining property. Utah Code section 78-34-10(2) describes
severance damages as those damages "which will accrue to the portion [of
property] not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the improvement in
the manner proposed by the plaintiff." This section has no express
requirement that the view-impairing structure be built directly on the
condemned land. Rather, it only requires that the severance damages be
caused by the condemnation of, and use of, the property.
Id. at ^ 17-18 (emphasis added).
Based upon these principles, the Supreme Court made the following ruling:
11
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When land is condemned as part of a single project-even if the viewimpairing structure itself is built on property other than that which was
condemned-if the use of the condemned property is essential to the
completion of the project as a whole, the property owner is entitled to
severance damages. Logically, if the project could not be built without
taking the condemned land, the impairment of view caused by the
completion of the project could and would not have arisen "but for" the
condemnation. This is the very essence of cause.
Id. at U 21 (emphasis added).
The key facts noted by the Utah Supreme Court in the Ivers case are for all
essential purposes identical to the facts in the present case:
1.

Both cases involved the taking of property that was an essential part of the

overall project.2
2.

In both cases, the elevated roadway blocked the view from the remaining

property.
3.

In neither case was the view offending structure constructed on the land

4.

In both cases, the property taken was used by UDOT to construct an access

taken.

road and other improvements related to the project that separated the damaged remainder
property from the project improvements.
5.

The remaining property abuts the property taken to relocate the access road

and a large storm drain.
These facts satisfy the Supreme Court's ultimate holding in Ivers that:

It is undisputed that the taking of Admiral's property was necessary and essential
for the 1-15 project. This can be shown through UDOT's own condemnation documents.
(R. 673, 678-684).
12
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With respect to lost view, severance damages are appropriate under Utah
Code section 78-34-10 where a portion of property is condemned by the
state and the condemnation of that land causes damage to the
noncondemned portion of land. Damage to the noncondemned portion of
land is "caused" by the severance . . . when the view-impairing structure is
built on land other than the condemned land, but the condemned land is
used as part of a single project and that use is essential to completion of the
project.
Id. at Tf 26 (emphasis added). That is exactly what has occurred in this case.
Despite the obvious similarities between the Ivers case and the present case, the
Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the Ivers decision as distinguishable. Moreover,
the decision of the Court of Appeals to exclude evidence of severance damages based on
loss of view fails to note that the facts of the present case comply fully with all of the
requirements of the Ivers decision and of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(2).
The case of Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974),
cited in passing by the Court of Appeals, is not on point. The offending structure in that
case was in fact erected "within the existing right-of-way."
The Court there noted:
The rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of
an abutting owner on a street; they constitute property rights forming part
of the owner's estate. These substantial property rights, although subject to
reasonable regulation, may not be taken away without just compensation.
* * *

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(2) provides:

(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned
and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff;
13
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One of the rights appurtenant to abutting property is that of receiving light
and air from the highway and an abutting owner is entitled to compensation
for infringement of his right to light and air by a structure in the highway,
even if it is a proper highway use.
* >Jc *

An owner of land abutting on a street is also in possession of an easement
of view, which constitutes a property right which may not be taken without
just compensation.
As can be noted in the quoted excerpts, the Court's decision did not preclude
claims for severance damages where, as here, the offending structure in fact caused
substantial damage to the remainder that abuts the land taken as an "essential part of the
project" for relocation of the access road and a large storm drain. Nor does the Court
there indicate that the abutting "street" or "highway" must be owned by the Department
of Highways.4
In summary, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the factual similarities
between this case and the Ivers case. Additionally, the decision of the Court of Appeals
does not deal with the clear violation of the constitutional requirement that just
compensation be paid for the taking of substantial property rights, but instead simply opts
for "the ease of application and the predictability engendered by a brite-line rule [which]
are of such obvious benefit in this area of the law... ."

4

Also not on point is the case of State v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107, 57 P.3d
1088, which was simply cited but not discussed by the Court of Appeals. That case
involved (1) a claim for closure of an intersection and (2) abandonment by UDOT but no
claim for loss of view or visibility. See id.
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POINT III
The decision to exclude evidence of severance damages based on loss of
view will allow UDOT to reap a windfall at Admiral's expense.
As noted above, the so-called "brite-line rule" adopted by the Court of Appeals
would permit the UDOT to appropriate a substantial portion of the property value
belonging to Admiral. The decision to eliminate the value of view from the property
from fair market value provides a very significant windfall in the amount of that value to
UDOT at Admiral's expense because that value was specifically included in the price
Admiral paid for Lot 17 just two years previously, and for Lot 16 at the same time of the
take.
Admiral's expert, Jerry Webber, made three separate appraisals of the properties
in question. The first appraisal, concerning the fair market value of Lot 16 and Lot 17,
was dated November 25, 1994. Admiral purchased Lot 17 in March of 1995, based upon
the fair market value as reflected in that appraisal. Mr. Webber made a second appraisal
that concerned the fair market value of Lot 16 in October of 1997. Admiral purchased
Lot 16 in July of 1998, based upon the fair market value as reflected in that appraisal.
The harshness of the trial court's ruling is demonstrated by Admiral's purchase of
the property for its appraised fair market value, which clearly included both the value of
view and visibility, only to have UDOT take the property without paying any
compensation for view or visibility. Thus, the substantial value representing both view
and visibility are automatically shifted from Admiral to UDOT without a single dollar
being paid as compensation. This violates the constitutional mandate that property not be
15
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taken without payment of just compensation. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 22; Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arthur, 352 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1960) ("The standard of what is 'just
compensation' in the ordinary case is the market value of the property taken, that is what
a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.").
There is no justifiable reason why UDOT, unlike anyone else, should be permitted
to acquire valuable property rights without paying just compensation.
POINT IV
It is impossible to segregate loss of view damages from Admiral's
overall severance damage amount.
In preparing his appraisal report, Mr. Webber determined Admiral's severance
damages to the remainder, based upon all of the factors that a prudent and willing buyer
and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into account in arriving at fair market
value, including but not limited to, view and visibility. Mr. Webber was unable despite
extensive study and effort to identify comparable sales that did not take into account both
view from the property and visibility of the property from 1-15. (R. at R772-75.) View
and visibility are critical factors that affect any piece of property along the 1-15 corridor.
Any property located adjacent to 1-15 will have a combination of both such values and it
is impossible to allocate and assign a separate value to each. Licensed appraisers cannot
speculate as to such values, which can vary widely from one property to another, and
cannot be justified with true comparables generally used and accepted in appraisal
practices. As a result, it is impossible to segregate out loss of view damages from
Admiral's overall severance damage amount.
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Moreover, the trial court's Minute Entry and the Court of Appeals' Memorandum
Decision are both directly contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State Road
Comm 'n v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971. In Rohan, the State Road Commission took
a position similar to the position espoused by UDOT in this case. The State argued that it
was improper to permit the defendants' expert to take into consideration and testify
concerning diminution in value resulting from increased noise from the highway. The
Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's position and held that the testimony of the expert
who considered the increase in noise was properly allowed, notwithstanding the fact that
it would have been improper to segregate and evaluate noise as a separate item of
damage. The Rohan court held that
there should not be any attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item of
damage any loss of value due to noise or any other such intangible factor;
and this is true even where there has been an actual taking of property. Any
such attempt to so segregate and place a separate money value on the effect
the factor of noise would have upon property would inevitably involve the
uncertainty and impracticability above referred to in this decision. This
should not be done either for the purpose of making an award of a separate
item of damage, as was dealt with in the Williams case, nor for the purpose
of fixing a separate amount to be deducted from the severance damage to
the remaining property as plaintiff contends here.
On the other hand, in order to correctly evaluate the severance damages,
i.e., the damage to the remaining property, it is obvious that it should be
viewed in the composite as it will be after the taking and after the
improvement has been constructed. In making the appraisal it is not only
permissible but necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that
a prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would
take into account in arriving at its market value. The testimony of the
defendant's expert which is here under attack indicates that he conformed
to that formula. He properly and candidly included the facts that the new
freeway adjacent to the property, with the attendant increase in traffic and
noises, were among the factors considered in making his appraisal. But
there was no attempt to segregate and place a separate money value
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thereon. We think the trial court was well advised in admitting his
testimony and that no prejudicial error was committed.
Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
The same is true in this case. Mr. Webber properly considered loss of view as one
of many factors that reduce the market value of Admiral's remaining property. The
decrease in value resulting from loss of view cannot be segregated out and assigned a
separate money value in assessing the total mix of factors that Mr. Webber considered.
Mr. Webber stated as much in his affidavit. In fact, it would have been improper for Mr.
Webber to attempt to segregate out a separate amount related to loss of visibility and
deduct that amount from the overall severance damages. See Rohan, 487 P.2d at 859
("This should not be done either for the purpose of making an award of a separate item of
damage, . . . nor for the purpose of fixing a separate amount to be deducted from the
severance damage to the remaining property as plaintiff contends here.").5
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it was error to exclude evidence of Admiral's severance
damages relating to loss of view from the remaining property. Therefore, the Court
should reverse the trial court's December 27, 2007 Minute Entry and the Memorandum
Decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this matter for further proceedings
consistent with the Court's ruling herein.

5

Counsel for UDOT was extremely critical of the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Rohan, referring to it as an "embarrassment to the Court." (R. 994 at 48-49.) Despite
counsel's personal opinion regarding this Court's decision, Rohan has never been
overturned and remains binding case law.
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DATED this 27th day of May, 2009.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By: /s/ Reed L. Martineau
Reed L. Martineau
D. Jason Hawkins
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 28, 2008.
Memorandum Decision and Order, of Judge Roth, dated October 31, 2005.
Trial Court Minute Entry, dated December 27, 2007.
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